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2SUMMARY
This paper develops and presents five propositions about the consequences of EU en-
largement.
1. Although the most advanced transforming countries have achieved remarkable
success in their modernization efforts by adopting a passive policy approach,
their preparations for EU accession necessitate a more active, ‘developmental’ in-
volvement by the state.
2. Accession will not generate an automatic increase in modernization inducing and
trade-augmenting FDI. The net inflow of FDI may be joined by an outflow, so that
some acceding countries could face a wave of divestment in some industries.
3. Competition between locations will resume, challenging the position of some af-
filiates that were purchased for market-seeking reasons during the privatization
of the transition decade. Enlargement will bring about a reallocation of FDI
stocks, as multinationals (MNCs) possessing subsidiaries of a market-seeking type
in more than one candidate country rationalize their production. Rationalization
may also affect subsidiaries established with resource-seeking investment mo-
tives.
4. Subsequent FDI in acceding countries will reinforce past specialization patterns,
in terms of the shares of market-seeking and resource-seeking FDI received by
specific industries. Candidate countries specialised in industries, which are typi-
cally recipients of market-seeking FDI, will increase their specialization in these
industries. On the other hand, in candidate countries where industries with re-
source-seeking FDI have a leading share in total industrial value added, the share
of these industries will increase even more.
5. Enlargement will accelerate changes in the investment motives of MNCs. Affili-
ates initially established with market- or resource-seeking motives will increas-
ingly improve their position within the MNC, so that the investment motive turns
to efficiency- and/or strategic asset-seeking. This trend already started in the
transition decade and will gain momentum after accession.
5INTRODUCTION
The transforming countries, in the ‘long
transition decade’, have achieved remark-
able success with minimal state interven-
tion. By adopting a passive policy approach,
they have allowed themselves to be driven
forward by the modernizing effects of for-
eign direct investment (FDI). However, the
challenges that follow EU accession will
compel them to adopt an approach of more
active state involvement. Local economic
policy decision-makers will need to work
out how to redefine the position of their
countries in the world economy.
This paper develops and presents five
propositions about the consequences of EU
enlargement.
1. Although the most advanced transform-
ing countries have achieved remarkable
success in their modernization efforts by
adopting a passive policy approach, their
preparations for EU accession necessitate
a more active, ‘developmental’ involve-
ment by the state.
2. Accession will not generate an automatic
increase in modernization inducing and
trade-augmenting FDI. The net inflow of
FDI may be joined by an outflow, so that
some acceding countries could face a
wave of divestment in some industries.
3. Competition between locations will re-
sume, challenging the position of some
affiliates that were purchased for mar-
ket-seeking reasons during the privati-
zation of the transition decade. Enlarge-
ment will bring about a reallocation of
FDI stocks, as multinationals (MNCs)
possessing subsidiaries of a market-
seeking type in more than one candidate
country rationalize their production. Ra-
tionalization may also affect subsidiaries
established with resource-seeking in-
vestment motives.
4. Subsequent FDI in acceding countries
will reinforce past specialization pat-
terns, in terms of the shares of market-
seeking and resource-seeking FDI re-
ceived by specific industries.1 Candidate
countries specialised in industries, which
are typically recipients of market-
seeking FDI, will increase their speciali-
zation in these industries. On the other
hand, in candidate countries where in-
dustries with resource-seeking FDI have
a leading share in total industrial value
added, the share of these industries will
increase even more.
5. Enlargement will accelerate changes in
the investment motives of MNCs. Affili-
ates initially established with market- or
resource-seeking motives will increas-
ingly improve their position within the
MNC, so that the investment motive
turns to efficiency2- and/or strategic
asset-seeking.3 This trend already started
in the transition decade and will gain
momentum after accession.
DOES PREPARING FOR EU ACCESSION
CALL FOR A MORE ACTIVE STATE?
Arguing for more state activism in govern-
ing and promoting modernization and sus-
tainable competitiveness may seem out-
moded in an era marked by increasing ero-
sion of state capacity, due to the globaliza-
                                                
1 The motive behind resource-seeking location
decisions is to acquire specific resources, such as
raw materials or labour, at the lowest real cost.
2 The motive behind efficiency-seeking investment
is to configure assets globally in a way that maxi-
mizes efficiency within the group and exploits
economies of scale. The value chain within firms
then becomes globally distributed, with higher
specialization in specific locations.
3 Strategic asset-seeking investment is intended to
acquire dynamic, mainly intangible resources and
create factors such as knowledge, innovation ca-
pabilities, or management or organizational skills.
6tion of markets, firms and technologies and
to a shift in political action to sub-national
and supranational levels. Papers from a
wide range of disciplines – political science,
economics, sociology and political geogra-
phy – document the ‘hollowing out’ of na-
tion-states due to the twin processes of
globalization and localization. (Grande,
2000; Jessop, 1999; MacKinnon and
Phelps, 2001). Such arguments may seem
especially obsolete in the EU candidate
countries. The trend described by Jessop
(1999, p. 393) as disappearance of ‘the
taken-for-granted primacy of state appa-
ratuses’ and the emergence of ‘varied forms
and levels of partnership between official
and non-governmental organizations in
managing economic and social relations’ is
especially conspicuous in the EU. So the de-
gree of policy freedom in the candidate
countries will diminish after accession.
Nevertheless, European political
practice abounds in examples of state ac-
tivism. Sizeable governmental intervention
to promote national competitiveness is
found in three fields. The first is regional
development, which involves national gov-
ernment as well as local, regional and su-
pranational actors. Though the form of in-
volvement by the national government has
changed: interventionist states have turned
into enabling ones, the significance of na-
tional governments as promoters of re-
gional cohesion and competitiveness should
not be underestimated. The second, with
extensive public support and investment, is
technology and innovation. Although the
declared objectives and procedures of state-
level intervention have undergone compre-
hensive transformation in both fields –
away from direct public financing of in-
dustry-specific programmes towards gen-
eral priorities and generating externalities –
substantial amounts from the state budget
are still devoted to government-promoted
development. The third is investment pro-
motion. Advanced economies tackle in
global competition among localities by of-
fering generous investment incentives.
Although the resources devoted by
transforming countries to ‘government-
push’ development are much smaller than
those offered by the advanced economies,
more political activism is necessary for two
reasons.
The first relates to the new suprana-
tional institutional context to which the ac-
ceding countries will belong. One essential
function of nation-states here is coordina-
tion and management of relationships on
the regional, national and European planes.
National governments have to devise a new
approach appropriate to the post-accession
challenges and begin to reformulate their
development goals. They have to stabilize
their institutional relations and their proce-
dures of development financing, to provide
a clear definition of responsibilities that
complies with the European regulations. At
the same time, national governments need
to increase the amount of public funds they
devote to development. EU aid is usually
provided on co-financing basis, so that ac-
cess will depend (among other factors) on
the ability of the new members to meet
their co-financing obligations.
The other reason concerns more tra-
ditional action to promote competitiveness.
Alongside a multitude of unexpected chal-
lenges, accession to the European Union
will mark the end of the once-and-for-all
modernization effects of systemic transfor-
mation and opening up that have been
driving countries forward even without
much systematic policy effort.
These challenges and some other pol-
icy actions required are detailed in the fol-
lowing chapters.
RATIONALIZATION AND A WAVE OF
DIVESTMENT?
The trade-creating effects of EU accession
and the intensification of inward FDI are
oft-proclaimed benefits for acceding coun-
tries, but neither of these prospects is as
straightforward as it seems.
7Consider the gravity model of trade,4
developed to assess the long-term trade po-
tential between two countries or groups of
countries. This draws the analogy of the
gravity law in physics to suggest that the
volume of trade between any two countries
is influenced by their respective sizes and
the economic distance between them. Trade
flows between Eastern European countries
and the West in the late 1980s were still far
below their gravity norm (Faini and Portes,
1995; Winters and Wang, 1994; Black,
1997; Brenton and Di Mauro, 1999). Bilat-
eral trade between the EU and the CEE
(Central and East European) countries in-
creased very rapidly after the Europe
Agreements of 1992. The most advanced
transforming economies quickly ap-
proached the hypothetical level suggested
by the gravity model (some have got even
beyond this level). The upsurge has been
due not only to the dismantling of EU-CEE
trade barriers, but also and mainly to large
trade-augmenting flows of FDI facilitating
the rapid reorientation of trade.
At the present level of economic in-
terpenetration, fully-fledged membership
cannot automatically generate significant
further increases in bilateral trade or trade-
enhancing FDI. What is more, rationaliza-
tion measures may bring closures of some
existing foreign affiliates in acceding
countries.
Reallocation of the FDI stock will af-
fect mainly investments carried out with
market-seeking motives. Although foreign-
owned subsidiaries of large MNCs can be
considered reasonably well prepared to
meet the challenges of intensifying compe-
tition, plant closures can be expected, as the
owners of affiliates reappraise their organi-
zation and recalculate factor costs follow-
ing the EU accession of the host country.
They will have to decide whether the tech-
nological and managerial capabilities in
their affiliates are sufficiently developed for
                                                
4 The model, devised by Tinbergen (1962) was
given sound theoretical underpinning by Anderson
(1979) and Bergstrand (1985).
an EU company. They will compare pro-
ductivity and profitability levels, size, in-
come-generating capability and technologi-
cal level in their production facilities in the
new member-countries and in core EU
countries. These differences go much be-
yond simple productivity disparities. Large
gaps between the respective values of the
indicators can be observed in various areas,
and not necessarily in terms of profitability.
Although the activity of affiliates in candi-
date countries is often highly profitable,
there are significant differences between
the operational properties of EU-based and
extra-EU affiliates in terms of capital and
labour intensiveness, unit size, market ori-
entation, technological level, and so on.
These differences are rooted in the
business history of the units concerned. In
transforming countries, most essential ac-
tors in the fast-moving consumer-goods
(FMCG) sector5 – a typical recipient of
market-seeking FDI – have been bought by
foreign investors. Privatization offered a
unique opportunity to MNCs competing in
the saturated markets of developed coun-
tries to gain huge new markets. They
therefore established local subsidiaries with
overlapping activities and product mixes in
several transforming countries. The busi-
nesses acquired were restructured only up
to a specific level, to make them capable of
meeting local and regional market expecta-
tions. Technology was upgraded and the
finances were restructured to ensure that
the new acquisition produced to the requi-
site quality. Besides producing a wide range
of products themselves, local subsidiaries
manage the local distribution of their par-
ent company’s complementary products not
produced locally. Domestic market orienta-
tion is dominant but not exclusive, since
some of these companies also make regional
and some EU sales.
The high share of domestic sales, wide
range of products, relatively low level of
                                                
5 This covers products of the food-processing and
household-care industries, personal hygiene prod-
ucts, tobacco and spirits.
8technology intensity and high level of la-
bour intensity comply neither with the
drive within the European integration proc-
ess to exploit economies of scale, through
enlargement and homogenization of mar-
kets (Fagerberg, 2000) nor with the trends
in the industries concerned. What are these
trends? The optimal size (for output) and
specialization level of FMCG companies
keep increasing in the advanced economies.
Companies have to comply with ever
stricter safety, environmental and hygiene
standards. Compliance necessitated huge
investment, which causes efficiency re-
quirements to increase as well. The need for
an optimum use of resources involves ra-
tionalization. FMCG companies in advanced
countries have therefore been undergoing
painful rationalization for several years.
The survivors are large and highly efficient
companies, with a relatively narrow prod-
uct line and consequently strong global ori-
entation.
As a consequence, the capital and
technology intensity of the present EU com-
panies in these industries is markedly
higher and the labour intensity markedly
lower than a decade ago. Since the affiliates
in the acceding countries in these industries
fall far short of the optimum size, technol-
ogy level, labour intensiveness and produc-
tivity, accession will certainly be followed
by rationalization and more conspicuous
and less tolerable redundancies.
The surviving production facilities
among the competing locations in the new
EU member-countries will undergo a sec-
ond wave of restructuring. They will ex-
pand their activities, but also undergo sig-
nificant changes in technological and or-
ganizational terms. Production technology
will be upgraded, so that they come to re-
semble the affiliates in the core EU coun-
tries in the length of their production run,
their product range and their capital and
labour intensity. They will gain wider
product mandates6 in terms of markets
                                                
6 See Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) on the evolu-
tion of subsidiaries.
served and cover further functional areas
besides simple production, for the much
narrow range of products in which they
will specialize. So the second wave of re-
structuring will be marked by sizeable
trade-augmenting investment. Conse-
quently the originally market-seeking mo-
tives that characterized these affiliates
when they were established will give way to
an efficiency-seeking motive. The changes
in investment motive will reflect changes in
the subsidiaries’ position and function
within their owners’ multinational organi-
zation.
CHANGES IN SPECIALIZATION
PATTERNS?
Which affiliates will shut down and which
develop, so that their features become com-
parable with EU companies? Which trans-
forming countries are better positioned in
the forthcoming competition among loca-
tions? At present, the distribution of market,
resource and efficiency-seeking investment
is uneven across transforming countries.
There are several methodological proce-
dures for classifying countries according to
their specialization patterns, including ob-
servations about the RCA indices of sectors
in terms of the Pavitt (1984) taxonomy,7
quantification exercises of vertical intra-
firm trade (Landesmann and Burgstaller,
1997) and of the share of ‘production-
fragmentation’ exports in manufacturing
exports (Kaminski and Ng, 2001). Irre-
spective of the methodology, papers usually
classify Poland as a country specialized in
traditional sectors, with a large share of in-
dustries with market-seeking FDI. The
Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia are
                                                
7 The Pavitt taxonomy analyses the technological
content of trade, classifying industries as tradi-
tional and resource-intensive; scale-intensive; high-
tech; and specialized suppliers. See Guerrieri
(1999) for a recent overview of the literature.
9mentioned as countries specialized in re-
source-intensive and technology-based
scale-intensive sectors, with a large share of
resource-seeking FDI. Accession to the EU
will redraw the specialization patterns of
the acceding countries. One expected trend
will be a crystallization of past specializa-
tion patterns – viewed as a distribution of
shares of industries with market-seeking or
resource-seeking FDI.
In the past decade, the distribution of
GDP shares across industries in transform-
ing countries was determined by external
forces (FDI and production relocation)
rather than endogenous development.
There is reason to believe that this trend
will continue. Following accession, external
forces are bound to reinforce the past dis-
tribution pattern of industries with market-
seeking and resource-seeking FDI. At the
same time, they will transform the original
market or resource-seeking patterns into
efficiency-seeking ones. There are four
strands in theoretical research to support
this hypothesis.
The first concerns the implications of
country size.8 Transforming countries with
a large domestic market and a relatively
high share of FDI stock in sectors where
market-seeking investment is dominant
may benefit from further investment in
these sectors (carried out to upgrade exist-
ing affiliates). Krugman (1980) finds that if
countries are identical in all respects except
size, the country with the relatively larger
domestic market will be the net exporter of
goods (the home country effect). This effect
will produce a similar outcome in trans-
forming economies. Due to higher domestic
demand for the products in countries with
a large domestic market, production runs
are longer and technology more developed
compared with those of affiliates in small
countries, already as a result of their initial
restructuring in the early 1990s. Other
factors being equal, therefore, the winners
in the rationalization, among affiliates with
                                                
8 Amiti (1998) provides a good overview of the
literature.
overlapping activity and product mixes,
will be the ones located in larger countries.
They will receive the investment aimed at
making them similar to core EU plants in
technological and functional terms. Their
host countries’ specialization in these in-
dustries will increase. At the same time, the
original investment motivation of the own-
ers will undergo substantial transformation.
Industries originally characterized by local
market-seeking type of FDI will become net
exporters after accession, which will group
them into the category of industries with
efficiency-seeking investment.
The location decisions of MNCs are
also influenced by other factors besides
market size and factor endowment. These
include institutional tightness and proactive
behaviour by the authorities: investment
promotion efforts and investment after-care
programmes. Equally or even more impor-
tant are the managerial capabilities of local
affiliates and their ability to expand their
charter,9 i.e. assume corporate functions
other than production. (The independent
market-acquiring capability and R and D
potential will be considered.)
The wave of rationalization described
hits market-seeking investments, i.e. com-
panies originally established to serve the
domestic market that have proved unable to
turn into efficiency-seeking investments.10
                                                
9 Birkinshaw and Hood (1988) define charter as
the business – or elements of business – in which
the subsidiary participates and for which it is rec-
ognized to have responsibility within the MNC. It
is defined in terms of markets served, products
manufactured, technologies held, functions cov-
ered, or any combination of these.
10 Switches from being a market-seeking subsidiary
into being an efficiency seeking one or – if exam-
ined from the point of view of the investors –
from a multi-domestic strategy to a global one
could be observed in FMCG and other industries.
In the 1990s, similar switches also occurred in
some transforming countries in the power-
generation equipment industry. Lower than ex-
pected domestic demand made the owners of pri-
vatized companies in this industry reshape the
strategic function of their local subsidiaries. In-
stead of manufacturing complex equipment and
10
The opposite side of the coin is the defen-
sive increase11 in the specialization of
small, outward-oriented economies on in-
dustries with resource-seeking investment,
due to plant closures in industry segments
with market-seeking FDI.
Resource-seeking investment may also
undergo a wave of rationalization caused
by factor-cost changes. Relocation to extra-
EU countries can be expected in industries
characterized by low local value added. Ac-
cording to the most pessimistic scenario,
countries with a high share of resource-
seeking investment, whose economic actors
have proved unable to move up the ladder
of technological learning and increase the
local value added during the decade of
transition, may become the big losers by EU
accession. They may prove unable to retain
their market-seeking investors and be hit by
a relocation wave in industries featuring
low domestic value added, where resource-
seekers face a reduction in factor-cost dif-
ferentials. The possibility of this scenario
does not depend purely on country size.
There is a rapidly increasing literature de-
scribing how changes in the organization of
production and product development are
altering the terms of competition and cre-
ating significant global opportunities for
small countries (Bara and Csaba, 2000). It
depends rather on capability of competence
accumulation.
The second analytical approach is to
enquire into the consequences of regional
integration for FDI (Dunning, 1997; Pearce
and Papanastassiou, 1997). According to
this line of research, the removal of trade
barriers may turn local market-oriented
production affiliates into export-oriented
                                                                         
systems for the domestic markets, the owners in-
corporated these subsidiaries into their global net-
works as component manufacturers (Szalavetz,
1998).
11 Measured by relative shares in statistical analy-
ses. If some market-seeking companies exit the
market, the proportion of resource-seeking com-
panies increases, through the reduction of the de-
nominator.
ones. In a process of region-wide rationali-
zation, affiliates focused on the host market
will have to narrow their product range.
Scale-related production will become more
concentrated and intra-EU trade increase.
This approach predicts changes in the
functions of import-substituting affiliates,
due to the removal of tariffs and other trade
restrictions. In the transition economies,
import substitution was not the intention
that led to the inefficient affiliates focused
on the host market. Rather it was the priva-
tization opportunities in local FMCG in-
dustries, which caused MNCs to adopt
multi-domestic strategies. For different
reasons, there will be a similar outcome: the
original market-seeking motive will turn
into an efficiency-seeking one.
The third line of argument investi-
gates the path dependence of international
trade specialization patterns. There have
been a number of papers showing that
trade specialization in advanced economies
is remarkably stable over time.12 Some
transforming economies, on the other hand,
have experienced considerable changes in
their export specialization patterns (see
Landesmann, 1996; Freudenberg and
Lemoine, 1999; Havlik, 2000, Soós, 2000).
Since these changes can be traced back to
the effects of systemic transformation and
to the process of opening up to the world
trading system and integration into it, fur-
ther changes of a similar magnitude are
unlikely. The incorporation of these
economies into global economic activity
suggests that elements of their new spe-
cialization pattern will be quite persistent in
the medium term, which will make possible
only incremental changes. This applies es-
pecially to the typical recipients of resource
and efficiency-seeking FDI. Many of these
industries, particularly the technology-
intensive ones, are subject to intensive
globalization tendencies (OECD, 1996) and
display a strong geographical concentra-
tion, because they are scale intensive. These
                                                
12 For an overview, see Dalum et al. (1996) and
Gagnon and Rose (1995).
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features support the notion that acceding
countries where industries attracting re-
source-intensive FDI predominate will con-
tinue this specialization pattern. If existing
representatives of these industries can keep
up with their owners’ competence-
accumulation requirements, they can
achieve incremental changes in their spe-
cialization pattern and make these indus-
tries turn into efficiency-seeking ones.
The fourth body of literature focuses
on the determinants of subsidiary evolution.
Authors view the charter of affiliates as the
outcome of a dynamic process subject to
further changes.13 Changes are driven ei-
ther by headquarters initiatives or by sub-
sidiaries themselves (Birkinshaw, 1998;
Westney, 1999; Martinez and Jarillo,
1989). Related literature examines techno-
logical learning, with emphasis on the
evolution of firms’ capabilities of absorbing
technology, up to the level of independent
technology generation (Pavitt and Bell,
1992; Hobday, 1994).
The evolution of the capabilities and
charter of affiliates provokes changes in
their organizational position. Szalavetz
(2000) defined a local subsidiary’s position
within the hierarchy of its MNC as the set
of the owner’s expectations, which becomes
increasingly complex as the subsidiary’s
capabilities improve. Once the accumula-
tion of technological and other functional
capabilities attains a quality threshold, this
provokes changes in the owners’ invest-
ment motives. Changes in the owners’ in-
vestment motives during the transformation
decade were driven either by mistaken in-
vestor predictions about the evolution of
domestic demand14 or by a recognition that
                                                
13 As Engelhoff (1999) remarks, ‘Traditional mod-
els [of MNC organizational design] tend to be
models of equilibrium [focusing on the role of
structure and traditional mechanisms of co-
ordination] while the newer models are largely
models of change’ (p. 15).
14 Demand expectations proved exaggerated in
Hungary in some engineering sectors subject to
public procurement tenders. The same applies to
investors in Slovenia who had originally calculated
the acquired assets were more valuable
than initially expected. In the former case,
insufficient domestic demand ended the
initial market-seeking type of investment
motive and replaced it with a resource-
seeking or efficiency-seeking one, i.e. a
global strategy instead of the initial multi-
domestic strategy. The discovery of valuable
intangible assets in acquired companies
made several resource or market-seekers
locate part of their strategic R and D in
transforming countries.15 In shifting away
from their initial motives, they have thereby
become strategic asset seekers, while their
local affiliates have developed into special-
ized suppliers. These tendencies will be in-
tensified by EU accession.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS
The object of the paper has been to show
that EU accession in itself will not lead to
intensification of the beneficial tendencies
that have so far contributed to moderniza-
tion in the candidate countries. Accession
requires reconsideration and reformulation
of the passive policy stance being taken by
candidate countries, since it provokes ra-
tionalization and concentration moves on a
micro level and a progressive sharing of
responsibilities on the national and Euro-
pean levels of public policy.
In trying to remain afloat amid the
turbulence accompanying accession, eco-
nomic and regional policy-makers are rec-
ommended to offer creative investment af-
ter-care programmes to local market ori-
ented subsidiaries and maximize efforts to
make these the great survivors of rationali-
zation. They are also recommended to sup-
                                                                         
with the Yugoslav market, which collapsed soon
after their investment was made.
15 Instances in Hungary include GE, Knorr
Bremse, Ericsson and Nokia.
12
port competence accumulation at local af-
filiates (in conjunction local management),
to achieve an increase in local value added
and an improvement in the status of exist-
ing affiliates within the global organiza-
tions of their parent corporations. This will
allow local affiliates to shift from ‘primary
comparative advantages’ based on low la-
bour costs and to turn the initial resource-
seeking motives of investors into efficiency-
seeking or strategic asset-seeking motives.
* * * * *
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